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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Asst. Director, ORR

DATE: 10 March 1947

FROM : Chief, Presentation Division

SUBJECT: Preliminary Report on Production of National Intelligence Manuals

References: (a.) ICABS Memorandum of 14 Feb 1947 on "Production of National Intelligence Manuals."
(b.) Memorandum to Advisor for Management, ICAPS, Subject: Revision of Tentative T/O for ORR.

Enclosure: (A.) JISPB Organization and Standard Operating Procedure.

1. About 20 February, 1947, I was instructed by you to investigate the problems involved in CIG (ORR) assuming the responsibility for producing National Intelligence Manuals at an early day, in accordance with recommendations under consideration by the Intelligence Advisory Board.

Four specific steps were outlined by ICAPS in Reference (a.), as follows:

- a. Make a study of the various compilations of similar nature now in existence to determine the best format and outline for a comprehensive manual which would be of the greatest value to all government agencies and departments.
 - b. Upon determination of the most desirable outline, assign the various chapters to those agencies which have dominant interest in the title subject.
 - c. Make a survey of the administrative and personnel requirements for the project.
 - d. Study the problems involved in incorporating the personnel and facilities of the JISPB (producing JANIS) into CIG.
2. In discussing this matter with you and the Deputy Assistant Director,

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ORE, there appears to be two main considerations involved:

- a. To set up an organization in ORE to produce the Defense Project, preferably as a prototype for future National Intelligence Manuals.
- b. At some future unspecified date to consider the integration of the JANIS program with that of the National Intelligence Manuals.



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3. With the Chief, Planning Staff, ORE, I attended the following conferences to clarify the problem involved in 2.a above:

a. 24 February — Meeting of Planning Committee (Defense Project) to pass on revised outline of SID and to reassign production responsibilities to the various government agencies for the chapters and sections. At this meeting [redacted] (ORE) was designated Secretary of the Planning Committee and Chairman of the Working Committee.

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b. 3 March — Conference with [redacted] (ORE) and [redacted] (former Secretary, Planning Committee). The purpose of this meeting was to arrange for the transfer to the new Secretary of all records and reports of the Defense Project, and to determine the major difficulties which had previously been encountered in developing the Defense Project. These latter appeared in general to be:

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- (1) Problems inherent in any cooperative committee form of production.
- (2) Fluctuating requirements and objectives.
- (3) Conflicts with JANIS priorities.

c.2 27 Feb and 4 March — Discussions with Dr. Quam, Director JISPB, regarding the organization, methods, and procedures used in producing JANIS. Currently JANIS output is low, due to shortage of personnel in JISPB, and difficulty in obtaining material from various agencies. The current long range schedule calls for JANIS to be produced for most of the countries of the world. While the various JANIS produced during the war were pin-pointed for military objectives, the present plan generally is to cover an entire country in a single JANIS. The present scope of JANIS appears to be generally along the same broad lines as that envisioned for the National Intelligence Manuals, except for the much greater emphasis on topography. It was Dr. Quam's opinion that it would require approximately 30 personnel in JISPB to produce 6 JANIS a year. There are now about 20 personnel in JISPB, all of whom are assigned from the various contributing Government agencies. Dr. Quam further stated that the JANIS and SID programs as now set up appear to be competitive and duplicative to a large degree, to which he attributes many of the present difficulties confronting each of these programs. He also considered that OIG should take over and integrate JANIS and SID programs. As he saw it, JANIS was originally set up to centralize all strategic intelligence studies which had previously been done in each Department.

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With the coming of CIG and subsequently the idea of National Intelligence Manuals, he felt that the purpose of JANIS had, in effect, been superseded.

d. 5 March -- Meeting with [] Chief of Publication Branch, CIG. The purpose of this meeting was to determine the feasibility of publishing loose-leaf National Intelligence Manuals within CIG. [] stated that GPO had recently taken over control of the printing plant located in South Building. A three-man board composed of representatives from CIG, State, and GPO, set priorities of printing. It is understood that CIG and State have first call on its facilities, after which other GPO work would be done. From the viewpoint of convenience, liaison, and security, this plant appears to be ideally suited for the printing of National Intelligence Manuals. Col. Leers is in a position now to supply graphic and photographic, but not cartographic, services required for this project. 25X1

4. The tentative personnel requirements deemed necessary for the "Basic Intelligence Division" under the Intelligence Staff, ORE, are described in Reference (b.). In certain basic respects these differ from the present organization of JISPB. The former relies on working committees to carry most of the work which is done in the JISPB itself. The experience of JISPB indicates that considerable correlation is needed after material is received from the contributing agencies and that such correlation can be done effectively only by direct liaison between the analyst and the editor, rather than through a committee structure, which at best is a rather cumbersome form of organization for production. However, JISPB does

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have committee meetings on the working level to iron out major differences and to effect uniform procedures. It is considered that the JISPB organization which provides for an editorial specialist for each chapter is superior to the organization proposed for ORE. Instead of editorial specialists, the proposed ORE organization would rely on the Regional Branch specialists for support. In theory that appears sound, but in practice it may well turn out to be otherwise, unless the necessary specialists in ORE Regional Branches devote a considerable proportion of their time to the project. With five or six studies underway simultaneously, the small group in the Basic Intelligence Division might well be swamped in attempting to direct the production of these studies through various committees and sub-committees. Enclosure (A) indicates the complex procedure which JISPB, through four years of experience, has found necessary in order to turn out JANIS.

1. From a practical standpoint, it is desirable that the initial program of the National Intelligence Manuals be completed within a reasonable time, say the next five years. This would require an output of about eight Manuals a year, considering there are some 40 important countries to be covered. In addition, there is the matter of keeping these manuals up to date, which would require a revision about every six months. This is an extensive program and, if we are to meet it fully, requires that our plans be formulated at this time. While Reference (b) contains a method of producing the Defense Project in a satisfactory manner within the next year, it does not appear to be comprehensive enough to cope with the overall program set forth above. Experience within CIG indicates that the time elapsing between setting up a plan for an organization, and the recruiting and training of personnel for

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effective operation has far exceeded our estimates. To set up the Basic Intelligence Division will take at least six months, probably longer, if the experience of the Presentation Division is any criterion. Based on this experience, it probably would be at least 1 October 1947 before the Basic Intelligence Division would be at approximately full operating strength. In the meantime, the deadline for the drafts of Defense Project material has been set for 1 July 1947. In addition to processing this material, there must be decided a suitable format, method of presentation, preparation of copy, maps, graphs, and photographs for printer, binders decided upon and ordered, and a host of other miscellaneous items. All these matters should be well along before we can reasonably expect the first of the new personnel to report for duty.

6. Summary.

There are two major problems to be considered:

- a. Completion of the Defense Project.
- b. Developing a realistic program for National Intelligence Manuals within CIQ.

A. Defense Project

There appear to be three practical methods by which the Defense Project can be produced:

- a. Recruit personnel for a Basic Intelligence Division as indicated by Reference (b). The objection to this procedure is the length of time needed to build up such an organization. With this procedure it is estimated that the Defense Project would require the best part of a year to produce.
- b. Set up a temporary organization, composed of personnel already

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within CIG, to produce the Defense Project pretty much as it comes from the producing agencies. This procedure is a compromise between a high quality product which would be a prototype for other National Intelligence Manuals and the length of time required by the first method in a, above. This procedure should produce a crude but usable basic reference manual within the next six months.

c. Take over the personnel and facilities of JISPB on a temporary (loan) basis to produce the Defense Project. This procedure would make available almost immediately a trained group equipped to produce a Defense Project of a high quality, within the next six months, and at the same time to commence studies of other important countries.

B. National Intelligence Manuals

There are two feasible methods by which the program of National Intelligence Manuals can be undertaken:

- a. By developing, independently of the JANIS program, a Basic Intelligence Division as indicated by Reference (b). It appears that such a procedure will be slow in getting started and, through lack of experience, may not initially produce the best type of manual. This procedure also leaves untouched the problem of correlating the JANIS program with that of the National Intelligence Manuals.
- b. Take over the personnel and facilities of JISPB. The advantages of this procedure have already been outlined.

7. Recommendations

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- a. In view of the above, it is recommended that instead of recruiting new personnel for the Basic Intelligence Division, that steps be taken to incorporate the personnel and facilities of JISPB into CIG, at the same time undertaking a study in conjunction with the Joint Planners towards integrating the JANIS and National Intelligence Manuals into a single program under CIG. Since the personnel now in JISPB are on loan from the various agencies, it would be desirable to effect their transfer to CIG on a temporary basis until a permanent organization could be set up within CIG.
- b. If the foregoing procedure is not feasible at this time, it is recommended that a temporary group along the lines of Reference (b), and composed of individuals already within CIG, be set up to produce the Defense Project, and that further study be made to:
- (1) Correlate the JANIS program with that of the National Intelligence Manuals
 - (2) Determine, in consultation between ORE and JISPB personnel, the type of organization best suited to produce the National Intelligence Manuals within the CIG structure.
- g. Finally, should the decision be reached to set up the Basic Intelligence Division in accordance with Reference (b), it is recommended that a study of the JANIS program be undertaken as soon as possible to determine if it can be integrated with the program of National Intelligence Manuals, and if the personnel and facilities of JISPB can be incorporated into CIG. This is the crux of the whole program, for until these problems are solved:

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- (1) There can be no clear-cut program of National Intelligence Manuals because of duplication and conflicting requirements with JANIS.
- (2) It is not clear what should be the type of National Intelligence manual, since it is dependent on whether there will be a single, unified program under CIG, or two programs under different authorities.
- (3) We are uncertain whether to recruit all new personnel, or to supplement this procurement with the trained personnel now in JISPB.

Chief,
Presentation Division

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